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Abstract In this paper we use an experimental approach to investigate how
linguistic conventions can emerge in a society without explicit agreement. As a
starting point we consider the signaling game introduced by Lewis [28]. We find
that in experimental settings, small groups can quickly develop conventions
of signal meaning in these games. We also investigate versions of the game
where the theoretical literature indicates that meaning will be less likely to
arise—when there are more than two states for actors to transfer meaning
about and when some states are more likely than others. In these cases, we
find that actors are less likely to arrive at strategies where signals have clear
conventional meaning. We conclude with a proposal for extending the use of
the methodology of experimental economics in experimental philosophy.
Keywords Signaling · Experimental Philosophy · Meaning · Evolution
1 Introduction
Lewis [28] famously launched an attack on Quinean skepticism about con-
ventions of meaning. His basic idea that such conventions could emerge in a
society without explicit agreement has a number of precursors. To mention
just one, Adam Smith notes that
Two Savages, who had never been taught to speak, but had been bred
up remote from the societies of men, would naturally begin to form
that language by which they would endeavour to make their mutual
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wants intelligible to each other, by uttering certain sounds, whenever
they meant to denote certain objects. [37]
David Lewis, Adam Smith, and many others hold that, at least on the
basic level of simple signals, the emergence of meaning should be expected
to arise spontaneously. Such a claim is of obvious philosophical significance,
for it tells us something about how content, information, representation, and
meaning enter the world. Yet how are we to assess this claim?
In this paper we use an experimental approach to study this question. Re-
cent years have witnessed an increasing interest in experimental philosophy.
Most of these investigations study intuitions about traditional philosophical
issues ranging from epistemological problems to moral problems to questions
in the philosophy of mind. These studies usually apply experimental meth-
ods from psychology. We shall depart from this practice by drawing on the
methodology of experimental economics. We do so because methods from ex-
perimental economics are particularly germane for studying conventions in
the Lewisian framework. The reason for this is that Lewis imported tools from
game theory in order to explicate conventions of meaning. In particular, Lewis
appealed to the signaling game, a model of information transfer between two
agents, in his arguments for the conventionality of language.
In fact, some experimental economists have already begun to investigate
signaling games and the emergence of meaning in the lab.1 In this paper,
we draw heavily on the experimental methods of Blume et al. [8] who found
that small populations of subjects could develop conventions of meaning in
relatively short time periods in an experimental setting. We go further than
Blume et al. and find that meaning can emerge in a variety of settings. We
also explore scenarios where information may only be partially transferred.
The paper will proceed as follows. In section 2, we describe the basic models
that we explore experimentally. In section 3, we describe theoretical results
regarding the evolution of signaling games and outline our related experimental
predictions. In section 4, we briefly discuss the methodology of experimental
economics. In section 5 we describe our experimental set-up in detail. In section
6 we outline our results. And, lastly, in section 7, we discuss their significance,
their limitations, and, finally, outline a proposal for extending the use of the
methodology of experimental economics in experimental philosophy.
2 Signaling Games and Equilibria
The Lewis signaling games studied here involve two actors. Play of the game
proceeds in three stages. In the first stage Nature, or some exogenous force,
chooses a state of the world. In the next stage, the first actor, usually called the
sender, observes this state of the world and sends a signal. Finally, the second
actor, referred to as the receiver, observes this signal and guesses which state
1 There exists a significant experimental literature on conflict of interest signaling games.
Lewis signaling games are common interest and have been investigated less thoroughly.
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Fig. 1 A 2x2 signaling game. The nodes are labeled according to who makes a decision at
that stage of the game. The central node representing the first stage of the game is labeled
N for nature. The next two nodes are labeled S for the sender and the final set of nodes R
for receiver. The dotted lines between R nodes represent information sets. The nodes within
an information set are indistinguishable to the actor making a decision at that stage. The
final nodes are payoff nodes and show what payoff the actors receive for the combination of
actions leading up to that node.
of the world has occurred. The goal of these actors is to use the signal to help
the receiver guess correctly. If the actors do this successfully, they receive a
payoff. If they fail, they do not.
In its simplest version, this game has two states of the world, s1 and s2,
and two signals (or messages), m1 and m2. This version is referred to as a 2x2
signaling game. Figure 1 shows the extensive form of this game. This figure
should be read as a decision tree. It shows the order in which the decisions are
made, the options available to each actor, and the amount of information the
actors have when making a decision. As mentioned, the game begins when Na-
ture chooses one of two states. In an unbiased signaling game, Nature chooses
each of the possible states with equal probability, .5. In the biased signaling
game, Nature chooses one state with higher probability. Our experiment in-
vestigates behavior in both unbiased and biased 2x2 signaling games. We also
address a slightly more complicated Lewis signaling game in which there are
three states of the world and three signals. This is referred to as a 3x3 signaling
game. For this game we assume that nature is unbiased and assigns an equal
probability to all of the states.2
In order to inform subsequent results and discussion it will be useful to
say something about the equilibrium properties of these games. A strategy in
a game is a complete plan of action for a player. A Nash equilibrium for a
game is a set of strategies where no player can unilaterally deviate from her
2 Many variations exist on the signaling game. We do not, for example, consider games
where the interests of the actors conflict, or where approximately correct guesses of the state
of nature are rewarded.
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Fig. 2 In this figure, S stands for state, M for signal (or message), and A for act (which
specifies the receiver’s guess as to which state obtains). The numbers in the column below
S represent the states of the world, those below M represent the signals, and those below A
the receiver’s guess. The arrows between the left columns specify the sender’s strategy, the
right the receiver’s strategy.
strategy and improve her payoff. Lewis described Nash equilibria of signaling
games that have especially nice features and called these signaling systems.
In a signaling system, the sender and receiver use the signals in such a way
that their interactions result in success regardless of the state of the world.
Signaling systems are also referred to as separating equilibria because actors
use separate signals for each state of the world.
In the 2x2 game there are two possible signaling systems. In figure 2, di-
agrams (i) and (ii) show representations of the combinations of sender and
receiver strategies in these signaling systems. In (i) the sender sends m1 in s1
and m2 in s2. The receiver guesses s1 in response to m1 and s2 in response
to m2. In (ii), the signals, and the guesses, are reversed. In the 3x3 signal-
ing game, there are six signaling systems, one corresponding to each possible
strategy where the actors use a separate signal to denote each state. Diagram
(iii) shows one such signaling system.
Signaling systems are what are called strict Nash equilibria. This means
that unilateral deviation results in a strictly worse payoff. They are the only
strict Nash equilibria of the signaling games addressed here. These games do
have other Nash equilibria, though. Some of these are referred to as pooling
equilibria. With a pooling strategy the sender sends the same signal in each
state or the receiver makes the same guess no matter the signal. Diagram (iv)
in figure 2 shows an example of a pooling equilibrium for the 2x2 game in
which both the sender and receiver use pooling strategies. This outcome is
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obviously a poor one, but since neither player can unilaterally deviate and
improve her payoff it is a Nash equilibrium.
To this point, the strategies described have all been pure strategies, but
signaling games also have Nash equilibria in mixed strategies. A mixed strategy,
unlike a pure strategy, is one where the actor behaves probabilistically. For
example, a sender might send m1 with probability .5 and m2 with probability
.5. Figure 2 diagram (vi) shows a pooling equilibrium that exists in a 2x2
game. The decimals in this figure represent the probability with which each
signal is sent in each state. In this example, both m1 and m2 are sent with
probability .5 in each state of the world and the receiver always guesses s1.
The important feature of this Nash equilibrium is that the receiver pools
by always guessing s1. In a game where this state has a very high probability,
choosing the corresponding action while ignoring the messages will lead to a
success most of the time. The reason these mixed pooling equilibria are of
interest here is that theoretical work indicates that they are expected to arise
with greater frequency in games of higher bias [20].
Unlike the 2x2 signaling game, in the 3x3 game there exist a number of
equilibria that result in more success than the pooling equilibria but are not
maximally informative like signaling systems. In these partial pooling equilib-
ria information about one state of the world is transferred perfectly, while
information about the other two states is pooled. Figure 2 diagram (v) shows
an example of such an equilibrium.
3 Theory and Predictions
Lewis [28] described signaling systems, and thus conventional meaning, in
terms of rational choice, common knowledge, and salience. In line with how
Adam Smith described the process of arriving at simple languages in the quote
above, there is an obvious alternative to this high-rationality approach. The
signaling game can be played repeatedly with the sender and receiver adjusting
their strategy choices according to past experience. The original problem of
the emergence of meaning now turns into a clean, albeit more specific question:
Can learning from experience lead players to arrive at a signaling system of a
Lewis signaling game?
The theoretical side of this problem is quite well understood. As a first
approximation one can use the evolutionary replicator dynamics to investigate
whether populations of simple agents will evolve to signal successfully. The
replicator dynamics are the most commonly used model of evolutionary change
in evolutionary game theory. Previous work has indicated that the outcomes
of these models are closely related to the outcomes of various learning models
[22, 11]. For this reason, outcomes of models using the replicator dynamics can
inform our expectations for how agents will learn in the lab. Models of learning
are also investigated by evolutionary game theorists and our experimental
predictions will be informed by the results of a number of investigations that
apply learning dynamics to signaling games.
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Huttegger [23] and Pawlowitsch [32] provide a fairly complete analysis of
signaling games for the replicator dynamics. An extension that adds mutation
to the replicator dynamics is studied in Hofbauer and Huttegger [20]. Argiento
et al. [3] analyze the unbiased signaling game introduced above within the
context of a reinforcement learning rule.3 Huttegger and Zollman [25] providea
number of results related to the replicator dynamics in 2x2 and 3x3 signaling
games. Huttegger et al. [26, 27] provide an overview of much of this literature.
Skyrms [35] gives a more general overview of signaling games.
This theoretical literature leads to fairly robust qualitative predictions of
the effect of learning in repeated Lewis signaling games when players are ran-
domly matched. We use these results to generate the following predictions for
experimental subjects playing Lewis signaling games.
Prediction 1. In the unbiased 2x2 Lewis signaling game, observed play
will converge to one of the signaling systems.
This prediction is supported by at least two theoretical findings. Huttegger
[23] proves that in the unbiased 2x2 signaling game, the evolutionary replicator
dynamics converges to one of the two signaling systems. Argiento et al. [3]
prove essentially the same result for reinforcement learning. This result is
particularly germane as Blume et al. [10] find that reinforcement learning
tracks human subject performance in signaling games. Lastly, Blume et al. [8]
provide experimental results that support this prediction.
These theoretical results do not carry over to the cases where Nature is
biased, and neither are there existing experimental results for these cases.
Huttegger [23] proves that if one of the states in the 2x2 game has probability
strictly greater than .5, the evolutionary replicator dynamics will carry some
of the populations to one of the signaling systems, but others will be carried
to other outcomes such as pooling equilibria. The results in Hofbauer and
Huttegger [20] are qualitatively similar. This leads to a prediction for the
biased 2x2 case.
Prediction 2. In the biased 2x2 Lewis signaling game, observed play will
converge to one of the signaling systems or to a pooling equilibrium.
The results in Hofbauer and Huttegger [20] suggest that the strength of the
bias of Nature influences how often one should expect players to converge to
pooling outcomes. The greater the bias, the more often players do not converge
to one of the signaling systems. This yields a third prediction.
Prediction 3. In two treatments that differ in their probability for the
more likely state in the biased 2x2 Lewis signaling game, the observed
play will converge to a pooling outcome more often in the treatment
with the higher probability for the more likely state.
3 Reinforcement learning is one type of learning model commonly used in evolutionary
game theory.
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Our last and final prediction concerns the unbiased 3x3 game. As men-
tioned, these games have partial pooling equilibria. It is shown in Huttegger
[23] and, more thoroughly, in Pawlowitsch [32] that partial pooling equilib-
ria are evolutionarily significant. The replicator dynamics, as well as many
qualitatively similar evolutionary and learning dynamics, will sometimes con-
verge to a partial pooling equilibrium, though usually not as frequently as to
a signaling system. In particular, Huttegger et al. [26] find that 4.7% of popu-
lation starting points converge to partial pooling equilibria under the discrete
time replicator dynamics. Blume [9] investigate these games experimentally.
They find that populations quickly converge to signaling systems, but they
also provide experimental subjects with a complete history of play and with
psychologically salient signals that facilitate coordination. These works lead
to the final prediction.
Prediction 4: In the unbiased 3x3 Lewis signaling game, observed play
will sometimes converge to a partial pooling equilibrium, but will more
often converge to a signaling system.
In the remainder of the paper, we explore these predictions using experi-
mental methods that will be described in the next section.
4 The Methodology of Experimental Economics
Subject-based laboratory experiments, while once limited primarily to psy-
chology, have in recent decades played a large role in economics, sociology,
anthropology, and philosophy. The burgeoning use of laboratory experiments
across these disciplines has led to a number of distinct methodological schools.
While recent work in experimental philosophy tends to utilize methods famil-
iar to psychologists, our experiment will adhere to the tenets of experimental
economics. This section will briefly discuss the norms of experimental design
and why it makes sense for our experiment to conform to these standards.
Experiments in economics go as far back as Allais [2] and are now a staple
of the discipline. The laboratory setting provides the experimenter with a high
level of control that is often impossible to attain in the field, making the labo-
ratory an ideal venue to test the predictions of economic theory. Experimental
work has investigated a number of topics in economics, from price theory [39],
to bargaining [19, 16], backwards induction [7], and social or other-regarding
preferences [12].
Unlike psychology experiments, where subjects often are instructed to
imagine how they would behave in hypothetical situations, economics experi-
ments require individuals to actively participate in a game or strategic situa-
tion in which real money is at stake. Smith [40] refers to this payment scheme
as one of induced valuation. In other words, a subject’s payment is not just a
flat fee, but importantly hinges on the subject’s decisions in the laboratory in
a way that is consistent with the underlying theory being tested. The reasons
for this payment structure should be obvious—economic theory only provides
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concrete predictions as to how individuals will actually behave [13]. It is silent
on the topic of how individuals think they would behave in particular strategic
situations.
A second important and distinctive feature of economics experiments is
that they are by and large context-free. Participants are presented with the
most abstract formulation of the experiment possible, even if the purpose of the
experiment is to investigate some real-world phenomenon. This is done in part
because explicit reference to the real-world case could introduce a systematic
bias to the data. Consider, for example, a study on pollution and taxation. An
individual wishing to appear environmentally conscious might decide to levy
high taxes on companies that pollute. Presenting this subject with the same
strategic situation in the abstract could lead to the adoption of a drastically
different taxation scheme.
With respect to our experiment, both of the above two points about incen-
tives and context apply. Evolutionary game theory and models of individual
learning provide concrete predictions on whether or not individuals can con-
verge to signaling conventions. Thus for the experiment to be a test of the
theory we need to properly incentivize individuals. Secondly, ensuring that
our experiment is context-free is important. Since signaling and communica-
tion is obviously something our subjects do quite regularly outside of the lab,
presenting the game as having to do with communication may result in sig-
nificantly higher levels of coordination than would occur if the presentation of
the game was context-free. This is especially significant as our study attempts
to investigate how meaning can arise when no prior communication is present.
The details of these two points will be spelled out further in the next section.
5 Experimental Setup
In keeping with the decision to use design protocols from experimental eco-
nomics, and our goal of extending the results of Blume et al. [8] to signaling
games besides the unbiased 2x2 game, our experimental set-up was largely
drawn from the one developed by these authors.
During the experiment, subjects were asked to play 2x2 and 3x3 games of
the types described in the first section. The experiment was run in 20 sessions
each of which involved 12 experimental subjects. The subject pool consisted of
undergraduate and graduate students from the University of California, Irvine.
Subjects were recruited by e-mails announcing the experiment to students reg-
istered in the Experimental Social Science Laboratory subject pool. At the
start of each session, experimental subjects were asked to sit at a randomly
assigned computer terminal where they were presented with a set of instruc-
tions. These instructions, like the rest of the experiment, were programmed
and conducted with the software z-Tree [17]. The set of instructions provided
subjects with knowledge of the game and the payment structure employed.4
4 Instructions are available upon request.
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Player knowledge of the game was complete with one exception, which will be
elaborated shortly.
Within each session, six participants were randomly assigned to act as
senders and six as receivers throughout the experiment. Sessions of the 2x2
cases were divided into two treatments of 60 rounds each. For each of the total
120 rounds, every sender was randomly paired with a receiver in his or her
group. Every round consisted of two stages. During the first stage, each sender
was randomly presented with one of two possible symbols by the computer.
The symbols observed by each of the senders were chosen independently using
a predetermined probability. In some treatments the computer’s choice was
unbiased, i.e., both symbols were chosen with equal probability (.5/.5). In
other treatments, the choice of the computer was biased, i.e., one symbol was
chosen with a greater chance than the other (.7/.3 or .9/.1). After observing
the symbol chosen by the computer, each sender was then asked to choose
one of two signals to send to the receiver he or she had been paired with.
In the second stage of the round, each receiver observed the signal which
had been sent by his or her partner and was asked to choose one of the two
symbols initially shown to the senders. At the end of the round, all players
were informed as to which symbol the computer displayed, which signal the
sender chose, and which symbol the receiver chose. If the receiver’s choice in
stage two matched the symbol displayed by the computer in stage one, the two
players were informed that they had ‘succeeded’. If not, they were informed
that they had ‘failed’ that round of the experiment.
In each session, treatment I was identical to treatment II with the ex-
ception that the predetermined probability with which the computer selected
symbols for observation by the senders was varied. Furthermore, the symbols
displayed by the computer were altered. The treatment order was varied so
as to minimize ordering effects. In total, there were four runs of the unbiased
treatment, and eight runs each of the .7/.3 and .9/.1 treatments.5
The 3x3 experimental set-up was the same as the unbiased 2x2 case with
two exceptions. First, obviously, there were three possible states of the world
and three available signals for the senders. Each possible state appeared with
equal probability. Second, since we were not considering a biased variation
there was only need for one treatment consisting of 60 rounds. There were a
total of ten runs of the 3x3 treatment.
The only exception to players’ complete knowledge of the game regarded
the levels of bias with which the computer selected symbols to present to the
senders. Players in 2x2 cases were informed that this bias might vary from
treatment to treatment, but were not given the actual probabilities used, or
even a list of those that might be used during the experiment. Subjects only
gained information about this bias through observation over the course of the
treatment. This was done to prevent receivers from using their knowledge of
5 We completed only four unbiased 2x2 runs because this experimental set-up had already
been considered by Blume et al. [8].
10 Bruner et al.
the game to pre-emptively choose a strategy such as ‘always pick the more
common state’ rather than developing this strategy through experience.
Subjects received a $7 payment for showing up to the experiment. In ad-
dition, subjects were able to earn more based on their success throughout the
experiment. For each treatment, the payment received by each subject was
determined by randomly selecting two rounds of play and observing whether
that subject had succeeded or failed in those rounds. Each round of success
was rewarded with $4, and each round of failure with $1, so in addition to
the show up fee subjects could earn from $4 to $16 in the 2x2 cases and $2
to $8 in the 3x3 case. The rounds determining the payoff were not selected
from the first ten rounds of play in order to give subjects a period in which to
familiarize themselves with the game.
Risk aversion is higher when a greater sum of money is at stake [21]. There-
fore an incentive structure where performance in each round was potentially
worth a significant amount was used to prevent subjects from engaging in
non-optimal (risky) behavior for fun. The alternative would be an incentive
structure where, say, subjects received a small amount of money for each suc-
cessful round. It has also been argued that as players accumulate payoff over
the course of an experiment, their perceived level of wealth may change, in-
fluencing play [14]. The payoff structure employed here mitigates these effects
because subjects remain unsure of payoff gained until the end of the experi-
ment. Subjects were paid in cash immediately following each session.
Schelling [34] introduced the idea that there often exist ‘focal points’ of
coordination games that allow players to coordinate behavior in these games
without communication. Experimental results have since confirmed Schelling’s
theory [29]. In order to prevent such saliency effects from influencing the results
of our experiment, certain steps were taken. First, the symbols presented to
the senders and chosen by the receivers were @/! during treatment I and
$/∼ during treatment II. The signals chosen by the senders and viewed by
the receivers were #/% for treatment I and */ ∧ for treatment II. These
symbols were chosen because they are not naturally ordered or ranked by
saliency. (Numbers and letters, in contrast, are easily ordered.) Neither is
there any obvious way to associate these symbols with each other and thus
solve the coordination problem. Furthermore, the ordering of choices presented
to senders and receivers was picked randomly by the computer. In this way,
the subjects were prevented from using the physical ordering of the symbols
on the screen to improve coordination. Lastly, subjects made their selections
by clicking buttons on the screen with a mouse, rather than pressing keys to
prevent any keyboard ordering effects from assisting coordination.6
The subjects engaged in the experiment were, obviously, language users.
As a result they were likely predisposed towards certain assumptions about
communication and information transfer. In describing the experiment to sub-
jects, we primarily chose language that conveyed information about the game
6 It might be argued that players could still use keyboard ordering to assist coordination.
By checking individual trials, we verified that different groups associated different signals
with states, indicating that these associations were not formed using keyboard ordering.
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without explicitly describing the situation as one of information transfer or
communication. For instance, players were informed that they would be di-
vided into ‘role 1 participants’ and ‘role 2 participants’ in the experiment
rather than ‘senders’ and ‘receivers’. There was one exception to this rule,
which was that the sender’s choice was described as a ‘signal’ to his or her
partner.
As mentioned, our experimental design draws heavily on that of Blume et
al. [8]. The primary significant differences between the design employed here
and that of Blume et al. regard the information presented to the players. Blume
et al. primarily performed experimental trials of signaling games in which at
the end of every round, subjects were presented with information about the
choices made by every other subject in his or her group both for the previous
round and all past rounds of play. Our experiment, however, did not provide
subjects with this information. Instead, as noted, at the end of each round
subjects were informed only of their choices and the choices of their partners in
the previous round. Blume et al. also presented subjects with a pre-experiment
trial in which states and signals were labeled with the letters a and b rather
than symbols in order to, “[ensure] that players understand the structure of a
sender-receiver game, message space, and population history” (1328). We did
not provide such a trial. We chose to differ from the experimental set-up of
Blume et al. in these ways because 1) we are interested in the possibility of low-
rationality strategies leading to the emergence of meaning and 2) we wanted
to minimize contextual effects of the set-up on experimental participants. We
also, of course, depart from Blume et al. in considering treatments of biased
and 3x3 signaling games (though Blume et al. [9] consider 3x3 games.)
6 Results
We will proceed by addressing each of the four predictions made in section 1.
In each case we will present the results relevant to the prediction in question.
Prediction 1. In the unbiased 2x2 Lewis signaling game, observed play
will converge to one of the signaling systems.
In the unbiased 2x2 treatment our results conform to the previous find-
ings of Blume et al. [8]. Specifically, we find our experimental subjects are
able to consistently converge to signaling systems. Figure 3 shows results for
the average coordination achieved in the unbiased 2x2 runs as compared to
the expected coordination if the experimental subjects were choosing actions
randomly. Data points were calculated by determining the proportion of suc-
cessful sender-receiver interactions that occurred in the span of ten rounds.
As is clear from figure 3, signaling systems emerge rapidly, and by the 30th
round of play, the majority of subjects behave in a manner consistent with
this signaling system. This figure includes 95% confidence intervals—meaning
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that we are 95% confident that the intervals encompass the the true value of
the parameter measuring coordination in these systems.7
Fig. 3 Level of coordination in the unbiased 2x2 treatment. Results are averaged over
all four runs of this treatment, with average level of coordination calculated for every ten
rounds. The dashed line represents the average level of coordination expected if the receiver
ignores the senders message and simply acts randomly.
It should be noted that most of our runs did not converge to a perfect
signaling system. This was not just due to the subjects making occasional
errors or briefly experimenting with different strategies, which occurred with
some frequency. In some runs there existed subjects who stubbornly sent the
wrong signal or performed the incorrect act given the predominant signaling
system. For example, one sender sent the same signal in both states, even
though all receivers were employing the same separating strategy.
Prediction 2. In the biased 2x2 Lewis signaling game, observed play will
converge to one of the signaling systems or to a pooling equilibrium.
As described in section 3, we ran two types of biased treatments of the
2x2 game. In the low bias treatment the more likely state of the world was
chosen by nature with probability .7, while in the high bias treatment this
probability was raised to .9. We conducted eight runs each for low and high
bias cases. In general, the experimental data from both bias treatments support
prediction 2—observed play tends to converge to either a signaling system or
a pooling equilibrium. Unlike the unbiased case, non-optimal pooling behavior
was observed in both treatments.
In assessing prediction 2, we will first discuss the .7 bias treatment. In
the eight runs conducted, only one resulted in a pooling equilibrium. In this
7 Using individual behavior from the last round of our four unbiased sessions as inde-
pendent observations, we also employ a one-sided t-test to reject the null hypothesis of
independence (that states are independent of signals sent and signals are independent of
actions taken) with p<< .01.
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case the receivers picked the state of the world more likely to be chosen by
nature, while the senders mixed over the available signals in both states of
the world. Thus little to no information was transferred and, not surprisingly,
coordination was achieved approximately 70% of the time. The other seven
runs of the .7 bias treatment all converged to a signaling system (or something
close to a signaling system). By the last ten rounds of the experiment, receivers
in the separating runs were able to determine the correct state of the world
on average 90% of the time, significantly above the expected pooling rate.
Figure 4 shows the average coordination rate over the runs of the .7 treat-
ment that resulted in signaling systems, again with confidence intervals. We
also show the lone pooling outcome which is centered at the chance line but
vacillates quite wildly. This is due to the fact that when the less likely state
of the world occurs, the receivers fail to coordinate. Thus their success level is
stochastic as is the selection of states by nature.8
Fig. 4 Level of coordination in the low bias (0.7) 2x2 treatment. Results for the seven
treatments that reached separating equilibria are averaged, with average level of coordination
calculated for every ten rounds. Average levels of coordination for the eighth treatment are
represented with the gray line. The dashed line represents the average level of coordination
expected if the receiver ignores the senders message and simply acts randomly.
The data from the .9 bias treatment also support prediction 2 as will be
discussed below.
Prediction 3. In two treatments that differ in their probability for the
more likely state in the biased 2x2 Lewis signaling game, the observed
play will converge to a pooling outcome more often in the treatment
with the higher probability for the more likely state.
8 We once again employ a one-sided t-test with a null hypothesis that a sender and
receiver successfully coordinate 70% of the time. This is the highest possible success rate if
no information is tranferred. Using data taken from the last round of play in our eight .7
bias runs, we reject the null hypothesis (p-value<<0.01).
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As stated above, prediction 3 stipulates that the stronger the bias, the less
likely the population is to converge to a signaling system. To assess this claim
we compare the .7 runs to the .9 runs. Specifically, we turn our attention
to the observed play of the last ten rounds of these runs. Data for selected
experimental runs for the .9 bias treatment is presented in figure 5. We examine
the last ten rounds of each .9 run and count the number of times each sender
uses a particular signal in each of the states. Likewise, we track the number of
times each receiver picks a particular state upon receiving a signal from the
sender.
 Sender Receiver 
Group 2  m1 m2  s1 s2 
s1 .8182 .1818 m1 1 0 
s2 0 1 m2 .6 .4 
Group 4  m1 m2  s1 s2 
s1 0 1 m1 0 1 
s2 .25 .75 m2 1 0 
Group 5  m1 m2  s1 s2 
s1 .8246 .1754 m1 .9792 .0208 
s2 .3333 .6667 m2 .75 .25 
Group 6  m1 m2  s1 s2 
s1 .3333 .6667 m1 .9 .1 
s2 .3333 .6667 m2 .9 .1 
 
Fig. 5 Selected experimental runs for the 2x2 game with a 0.9 bias. In each session we
record the proportion of senders in the last ten rounds of the experiment utilizing m1 or m2
in s1 and s2. Likewise, we document the proportion of receivers that pick s1 and s2 upon
receiving m1 and m2 from the sender.
We find that in four of the eight .9 runs the population failed to arrive at a
signaling system.9 Group 6 (see figure 5) arrived at a pooling equilibrium. In
this case the senders signal with the same probabilities, regardless of state of
the world. The receivers in turn ignore the signal and perform the act that is
appropriate for the more likely state of the world. In groups 2 and 5, pooling-
like behavior was observed. In these cases, the receivers were more likely to
choose the high-probability state of the world, regardless of signal. In group
4 we observed out of equilibrium behavior, meaning that the participants’ be-
havior was not consistent with any Nash equilibrium. In this case, the receivers
separated even though the senders were pooling. They would have done better
to unilaterally switch to a pooling strategy.10 The fact that our laboratory
9 We conducted a one-sided t-test and in these four runs, we cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis that sender-receiver pairs are successful 90% of the time. This may seem like an odd
null hypothesis because in the unbiased and .7 bias cases, 90% coordination levels counted
as signaling systems. Inspection of the strategies of the actors in these cases (see figure 5)
though, makes clear that these populations truly did not reach separating strategies.
10 Because this case was unusual, we looked at data from the last 25 rounds of play as well.
In this larger sample, the senders sent m1 in s2 with higher probability (.66%). This partial
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subjects can get locked into such sub-optimal behavior for 20 or 30 rounds
may indicate that more time in the laboratory is required to accurately assess
the feasibility of the evolution of signaling in high bias cases.
To sum up, the results in the .9 bias case were noisier and harder to in-
terpret than those in the .7 bias and unbiased cases. Generally, though, they
support prediction 3. In the treatments with greater levels of bias, more pool-
ing behavior was seen. Note that they also support prediction 2.11
Prediction 4: In the unbiased 3x3 Lewis signaling game, observed play
will sometimes converge to a partial pooling equilibrium, but will more
often converge to a signaling system.
We conducted ten runs of the 3x3 treatment to assess whether signaling
systems would emerge in this slightly more complicated signaling game. We
find that signaling systems sometimes emerge but are just as likely to fail
to emerge. Even though nature is unbiased, signaling systems are difficult to
coordinate on in this more complicated game because there are many more
strategies available to both senders and receivers.12 Three runs led to robust
signaling systems with high levels of coordination, the remaining seven runs did
not. Figure 9 tracks the average level of coordination over 60 rounds averaged
over the runs that reached signaling systems and those that did not.
Even though relatively few of the 3x3 treatments resulted in clear-cut sig-
naling systems, the vast majority of these experiments outperformed chance,
meaning that sender-receiver pairs were successful more than 33% of the
time.13 Additionally, while separating systems were not ubiquitous, none of
the sessions resulted in a pooling or a partial pooling equilibrium.
It should be noted that there was a robust tendency for the levels of co-
ordination to increase over the course of 60 rounds. This occurred in all 3x3
runs, with there being no run in which the average level of coordination in
the first ten rounds was greater than the average level of coordination in the
last ten rounds. Furthermore, as is evident from figure 9, at the end of the
experiment the subjects seemed to still be improving their coordination. Thus
there is good reason to believe that if our experiment had been carried out
beyond 60 rounds, we would observe more coordination and perhaps more of
the experimental runs would have fixed on a signaling system or even a partial
pooling equilibrium.
To summarize, as in the 2x2 high bias case, the results in the 3x3 unbi-
ased case were somewhat messy and difficult to interpret. Better than chance
separation on the part of the senders may help explain why non-equilibrium separating was
seen by the receivers.
11 One caveat should be noted which is that in the biased cases actors encountered the
unlikely state of the world less often than in the unbiased cases. This may mean that they
simply has less time to learn a signaling system.
12 The number of strategies goes from four to twenty seven when we move from the 2x2
game to the 3x3 game.
13 A one-sided t-test confirms this. As in the unbiased 2x2 case, we once again reject the
null hypothesis of independence (with a p-value<< 0.01).
16 Bruner et al.
coordination, and the observation of some signaling systems, support the first
part of prediction 4. There was no obvious support, however, for the predic-
tion of partial pooling equilibria. However, for simple reinforcement learning
partial pooling equilibria do not have a large basin of attraction in 3x3 games.
14 The basin of attraction is larger in signaling games with more states and
signals.15 Further experiments with these signaling games might lead to more
information concerning partial pooling equilibria.
Fig. 6 Level of coordination in the 3x3 treatment. Average results for the three runs that
reached separating equilibria are represented by the black line, average results for the seven
remaining runs are represented by the gray one. The lower dashed line shows the average
level of coordination possible if the receiver ignores the senders message and simply acts
randomly. The upper dashed line shows the average level of coordination possible at the
partial pooling equilibrium.
7 Discussion
We find that signaling systems can emerge under a variety of circumstances.
That said, there are certain conditions which make it substantially more likely
for signaling systems to emerge in the lab. Our empirical results generally
confirm theoretical predictions of signaling games. When nature is biased in
the simple 2x2 signaling game, sub-optimal pooling equilibria can emerge. Such
inefficient arrangements become more commonplace as nature is increasingly
biased.
14 Huttegger et al. [26] found convergence to partial pooling equilibria to be rare (4.7%
of initial populations) in unbiased 3x3 signaling games under the discrete time replicator
dynamics.
15 Barrett [4] found that under Herrnstein reinforcement learning 8x8 Lewis signaling
games converged to partial pooling equilibria with greater frequency than 4x4 games, which
in turn converged to these more often than 3x3 games.
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The results were clearer in some cases than others. In particular, in the
3x3 case, the final strategies developed by the experimental subjects were
sometimes hard to interpret compared to the unbiased 2x2 case. As we have
indicated, this messiness may result from the difficulty of reaching coordination
in this slightly more complicated game given the short time period. In order
to assess this possibility, we constructed a simulation tailored to mimic the
experimental set-up. Using a simple learning model we compared the time to
reach coordination in each treatment.16 We found that there is an order of
magnitude difference in time to coordination between the unbiased 2x2 case
and the 3x3 case.17 This could give insight into why the subjects in the 3x3
case appear to still be improving coordination after 60 rounds.18 It may be
that in this case, even if signaling is a possibility, learning to signal may take
a substantial amount of time.
Before continuing, we will briefly discuss how the results of our unbiased
2x2 runs relate to those of Blume et al. [8]. First it should be noted that
our results are more readily applied to non-human animals and non-rational
agents. This is the case because, as mentioned, our experimental set-up was
designed to more significantly limit the amount of information available to our
subjects, thus preventing the use of certain high-rationality strategies such as
‘best-respond to the population in the last round’ or ‘best-respond to the
population history’. Our subjects could only respond to their own history and
that of their partners in each round.
Furthermore, our results were obtained in an environment which may have
been less favorable to the emergence of meaning. Because subjects were not
given access to population history, they had to instead rely on memory to
determine which action to perform. As mentioned, we also did not have sub-
jects perform practice rounds using symbols that had pre-established meaning
(such as ‘a and ‘b), as did Blume et al. Such practice rounds may have helped
Blume et al.’s subjects coordinate earlier and better because signaling systems
became salient. The fact that our subjects still managed to reach coordinating
strategies adds weight to the claim that meaning can emerge naturally through
repeated interaction.
16 Herrnstein reinforcement learning dynamics were used for this model. For a more de-
tailed description of this dynamics see Skyrms [36]. Blume et al. [10] find that Herrnstein
reinforcement learning provides a good approximation of human learning in signaling games.
The model otherwise conformed to the features of the experimental setup, i.e., there were
12 agents, etc.
17 In 200 runs of simulation, we found that actors playing the unbiased 2x2 game reached
a success rate of .95 (as defined by expected payoff given learned strategy divided by highest
possible expected payoff) in 6789 rounds on average. Actors in a 3x3 game, on the other
hand, took 43993 rounds to reach this success rate.
18 Perhaps surprisingly, in these simulations, actors in biased 2x2 games had even more
difficulty reaching separating strategies than those in the 3x3 game. This is contrary to
our experimental results. One potential explanation for this discrepancy may be that as
our subjects are language users they are predisposed to use signaling strategies. In the 2x2
biased cases they were able to do so because the number of available strategies was still
quite small. In the 3x3 cases, they were stymied by the greater number of strategies.
18 Bruner et al.
As is the case with any experiment, there are limitations in our experi-
mental design that should be mentioned. For one, in the 2x2 cases subjects
completed two treatments in each session, meaning that there was the possi-
bility of ordering effects influencing the results. The subjects may have learned
how to reach a signaling system in one treatment and learned a new signaling
system more readily in the second. To control for ordering effects, we alter-
nated which treatment the subjects completed first. In an attempt to assess
whether there existed an ordering effect, we calculated the average level of
success in the last ten rounds of each experimental run and compared those
that occurred in the first half of a session with those in the second half. No
significant differences were noted. Additionally, due to the repetitive nature
of the experiment subjects may have lost interest and become less attentive
in the later rounds. This could slow learning if they had not already reached
a signaling system. It could also disrupt an existing signaling system, deteri-
orating progress already made. This possibility was partially ameliorated by
our payment structure, but still may have influenced results.
One possible complaint about this work relates to the number of states in
the game. If the population has difficulty reaching separating equilibria when
there are only three states of the world, how can these results inform real-
world signaling where there are, obviously, many more states. It has recently
been argued by O’Connor [31] that actors can learn to transfer information
about many states of the world when there is more structure in the state space
of the signaling game. One possible extension of the work here would involve
investigating whether or not these results transfer to an experimental setting.
Another possible extension of these results regards recent work on signal-
ing games with partial conflict of interest. Interestingly, Wagner [43] as well as
Huttegger and Zollman [24] have demonstrated that there can be partial trans-
fer of information at equilibrium even when the interests of sender and receiver
are not completely aligned. The results of this paper have only explored the
transfer of information in cases of common interest. Investigating how meaning
can emerge under less favorable conditions is a natural extension.19
To date, there have only been a few philosophers who have employed meth-
ods from experimental economics to address questions in philosophy. Notable
examples include Bicchieri and Chavez [5] and Bicchieri and Lev-On [6]. These
authors have mostly focused on questions regarding norms and ethics. Game
theory and evolutionary game theory, however, have been applied more broadly
in philosophy, from the evolution of meaning [36], to the origin of logic [35], to
political and social philosophy [42, 41, 30], and to issues in decision and ratio-
nal choice theory [1]. When game-theoretic concepts are applied in philosophy,
it becomes natural to use experimental economics to gain further traction on
these philosophical topics.
In this paper, we present results for one such exploration. We would also like
to suggest that there is a great deal of important work still to be done using
19 There is an existing literature on information transfer with costly signals in experimental
economics. The proposed work would explore signaling when signal costs are less than the
amount needed to sustain full information transfer.
David Lewis in the Lab 19
methods of experimental economics to address philosophical questions. Ex-
perimental philosophers are natural candidates to perform this work. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, philosophically minded economists have already made inroads
in a number of different subfields of philosophy, such as social contract theory
[33, 38], political philosophy [18], and epistemic game theory [7]. Ernst [15] has
suggested that results from experimental economics have philosophical import.
This is clearly right, and adds bite to the idea that experimental philosophy
stands to benefit by adopting methods from experimental economics.
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